Transcript - Who Is Winning the Iran War: Tehran or Trump?
This debate was recorded on Tuesday, July 7th, before the verbal dissolution of the Islamabad Memorandum and the recent escalation of the Iran War.
Opening
John Donvan: This is Open To Debate. I’m John Donvan. Hi, everybody. You know, in writing about war, poets and historians and the news media have tended to use a list of word pairings that get used over and over again, such as overwhelming force, hasty retreat, ignominious defeat, decisive victory. Well, in this episode, it’s this last one, decisive victory, that’s gonna frame the debate that will start in just a minute.
When the U.S. and Israel launched their attack on Iran in February, decisive victory is what was promised. Now, months later, does the outcome such as it stands live up to that promise? Well, the answer depends in part on how you define victory and how you keep score and what remains unresolved and also whom you believe.
All we know is that the Trump administration and the clerics who rule Iran are both declaring themselves the victors. So which is it? That’s what we’re gonna find out. We are posing this question: who won the Iran war, Trump or Tehran? And we’re bringing on two subject matter experts, people who have really though about this and have strong opinions and who will be taking opposing views as we see them argue it out.
So let me introduce our debaters. Arguing Tehran in answer to the question who won the Iraq war, we have Suzanne Maloney, who is vice president and director of foreign policy at the Brookings Institution.
Suzanne, welcome. You were in fact, I’ve learned, one of the first Americans to go and study in Tehran after the 1979 revolution. Just really curious, what, what did that experience change about how you think about Iran?
Suzanne Maloney:
Thanks so much. And it was an absolutely transformative experience in terms of getting to know Iranians, having an understanding of the texture of politics and society and, uh, I think exposing me to a wide variety of opinions from across that society.
John Donvan:
It must’ve been just fascinating.
Suzanne Maloney:
It was absolutely e- extraordinary and it has really, um, meant, uh, that I have, uh, made my career around Iran as a result of that formative experience.
John Donvan:
Interesting. All right, let’s meet your opponent. Here to argue that Trump won, I wanna welcome Matthew Kroenig, who is vice president for Geostrategy and Fellows and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Matthew, welcome to the program.
Matthew Kroenig:
Thanks. It’s great to be here.
John Donvan:
I wanna note that Politico once called (laughs) you “one of Washington’s most prolific foreign policy wonks.” And wonk can be, uh, either a great compliment or a very Washington insult. (laughs) So how did you take it?
Matthew Kroenig:
(laughs) I took it more as a, a compliment. Uh, I think wonk is a, uh, a compliment in Washington. Uh, American University, one of the top universities here, promises that they’ll train, uh, future, future wonks. And, um-
Matthew Kroenig:
... and the “most prolific” part, I guess, I need to do something to stay out of trouble. So do a, do a lot of commentary on, uh, current events.
John Donvan:
And wonks do know how to have fun. And s- one of those ways is to debate, so let’s get to our opening statements. We wanna give each of you a chance to tell us why you’re taking the position you are. You’ll have up to four minutes to explain why.
Suzanne, you’re up first. You are arguing that Tehran won the Iran war. Here’s your chance, please, to tell us why.
Suzanne Maloney:
Beginning on February 28th, massive U.S. and Israeli airstrikes eliminated Iran’s long-ruling supreme leader along with an entire echelon of senior Iranian officials, quickly secured air superiority over the country, and exacted punishing blows on its nuclear program ballistic missile capabilities, Navy and Air Force. Despite these impressive operational achievements, Iran’s deeply institutionalized ruling system mounted a stunningly effective retaliation targeting regional, uh, economic and energy infrastructure and transit, and jeopardizing the security of its neighbors and the global economy. The Trump administration quickly found itself pinned down on a conflict where Washington could not prevail at an acceptable cost or timeline, forcing Trump to offer massive concessions to a third-rate terrorist state in order to end the war.
How do we define victory? Imposing steep costs on an adversary is not sufficient. Victory and war must be measured on the basis of strategic aims and outcomes. President Trump defined his goal as ensuring that Iran could not pose a threat to its neighbors or to the United States. Unfortunately, by every measure, he didn’t succeed. In fact, Trump’s war on Iran has compounded its sway, extended its reach, and the longevity of the regime. Here are nine reasons why.
The Iranian regime has re- emerged from this conflict emboldened and empowered by its survival, its suc- suc- its success in withstanding the worst that its two most feared and far superior adversaries could deliver, and then by the spectacular diplomatic breakthrough that ended with a memorandum of understanding whose terms are far more favorable to Tehran than any prior diplomacy with the United States.
Two, the war degraded Iran’s conventional military capabilities, but failed to achieve Trump’s much more ambitious aims. Tehran retains the technical knowledge and resources to reconstitute breakout nuclear capabilities including highly enriched uranium stockpiles. The war breathed new life into its proxy networks. And let’s be clear, the decimation of the Iranian Navy has been heavily offset by Iran’s evident mastery of drone warfare.
Number three, thanks to this conflict, Tehran now wields a new weapon of mass disruption, control over the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. failure to plan for this inevitability ceded a huge str- strategic and economic asset to Tehran. The messy implementation of the truce makes clear this control will not be easily undone. Hormuz and the front-loaded sanctions relief in the MOU could be game changers for an Iranian economy that was near collapse prior to the war.
Four, the war has taken a long-term, long-lasting, significant toll on American military readiness, sucking capabilities from key theaters around the world, degrading stockpiles of munitions, including missiles and interceptors that will take years to replenish, and leaving our partners more vulnerable. All of this came at a high cost to the U.S. Treasury and taxpayers. The initial price tag will run at least the 80 billion supplemental requests by the Department of War, probably much more when damage to our regional basis is fa- factored in.
The conflict, number five, has benefited Iran’s strategic competitors, enriching Russia through crisis-driven sanctions relief while enabling China to displace the U.S. as a guarantor of public goods by balancing energy markets.
Six, the war has amplified doubts among America’s friends and allies about the value of the U.S. security umbrella. In Europe, they see an America that has been humiliated. Our Gulf partners are now persuaded their survival requires integrating Iran into the regional system and the war has e- exacerbated fissures between the United States and Israel.
Seven, the war revealed, uh, important shortfalls in American naval power, diminished the credibility of long-standing U.S. guarantee of freedom of navigation, a key condition in preserving peace and prosperity around the world.
Eight, the war precipitated inflation at home and weakened the global economy. Spikes in fuel and fertilizer prices contributing to rising food and shipping cross, costs around the world. The World Bank has downgraded economic growth forecast to the lowest level since the pandemic.
And finally, perhaps the most devastating aspect of this failed war was the betrayal of the American people who had come to the streets demanding change. President Trump repeatedly promised that tr- help is on the way. Instead, he entrenched an evil regime and rewarded it with sanctions relief.
John Donvan:
Thank you very much, Suzanne, for your opening. Um, that leaves it up to you, Matthew. Your response, please, as you argue that Trump won the war in Iran.
Matthew Kroenig:
Okay. So the question is who won the war in Iran? And I would argue that Trump won and Tehran lost. Uh, and caveats are in order. The war is still ongoing. The two sides were just, uh, uh, trading fire this morning. Uh, but I would argue that the United States is in a better position now than, uh, before the start of the war and Iran is in a worse position.
So I think we, uh, need to remind ourselves that Iran has posed one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security since 1979. Uh, it pursued an illegal nuclear weapons program for decades and was very, uh, close to having, uh, kind of beyond the point of no return nuclear weapons capability before Operation Midnight Hammer last summer. It had the largest stockpiles of ballistic missiles in the region. It’s the world’s largest state sponsor of terror as the State Department has, uh, said over and over again. Uh, Iran’s killed hundreds of Americans and is actively, uh, trying to kill, uh, former U.S. officials, uh, as we speak. It’s also engaged in gross human rights violations. It hangs homosexuals. A- and it murdered thousands of its own citizens earlier this year.
Uh, since the war, um, much of that has changed. Iran’s nuclear program is now in, in rubble and it won’t have a nuclear weapon anytime soon. Uh, its conventional military has been badly degraded as the Trump administration has pointed out. Uh, its Air Force and Navy are essentially gone. Um, 85 to 90% of Iran’s ballistic missile drone and naval defense industrial base were damaged or destroyed, uh, during the operations according to U.S. Central Command. Uh, and it’s, it’s lost about one-third of its missile stockpile.
Um, much of the pre-war leadership, including, uh, Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader who ordered, uh, the killing of his people, are, are now dead. Uh, the current leadership is in hiding. Uh, and the Islamic Re- Republic has lost legitimacy with its own people and with the rest of the world, with even European officials, uh, saying that, uh, the Islamic Republic must go. Uh, and, and the Ira- uh, economy is in free fall. Uh, Iran’s suffering hyperinflation. It’s predicted to have a 6% decline in GDP this year. Uh, and by Tehran’s own estimates, it suffered 270 billion in wartime damage. Uh, so the Islamic Republic, uh, what has been one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security for years, is now is it, at its weakest point, uh, since the 1979 revolution.
Uh, the major counterargument, the major downside, uh, that Suzanne pointed out is that Iran is retaliating by attacking shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, uh, and that has been a cost. It’s leading to, uh, disruptions to energy flows and higher inflation, uh, in the United States. Uh, but, but this is an act of desperation by, uh, Tehran, uh, and it’s a wasting asset. We’re already seeing energy companies and, uh, countries in the region looking to route around, uh, the Strait of Hormuz.
Uh, and, um, you know, despite the, uh, uh, higher inflation, the U.S. economy is still doing, uh, well. There’s economic growth, low inflation, uh, uh, sorry, low unemployment, uh, and a booming, uh, stock market. And, and then we also have to have priorities when it comes to stopping, uh, a terrorist, uh, state from threatening the United States and its allies. Uh, that, that’s more important than, uh, higher energy prices, and that’s something that Trump has said, and I think he’s right on that.
So essentially, the United States traded the decimation of one of the world’s most dangerous countries in exchange for higher energy prices that will eventually subside. Um, I think that’s a good trade and why I say that Trump won and Tehran lost.
Uh, I would argue that there are other benefits, uh, as well. Uh, Trump said that help is on the way as the Iranian people rose up. Uh, and he followed through and killed Iran’s, uh, supreme leader. He and, uh, Israel did. So I think future Iranian leaders would have to think twice before doing something similar. Um, second, contrary to, uh, Suzanne, I think this has actually strengthened, uh, U.S. deterrence. Uh, if I were Xi thinking about attacking Taiwan or Putin thinking about attacking NATO, uh, this war would make me think that there is a, a real chance that the United States might get involved in a big way, and maybe I should think, uh, twice.
Um, so again, uh, in sum, uh, these are the reasons I believe that, uh, Trump won and Tehran lost. Uh, the United States is now in a stronger position and in, Iran in a weaker position than just a few months ago.
John Donvan:
Thank you very much, Matthew.
Uh, I just want to share back some of what I heard in your opening statements. Um, I just wanna make clear also that, uh, uh, uh, n- neither of you is on Iran’s side in this argument. Uh, I think what you’re, what we’re hearing is an assessment of the outcome of the war, uh, vis-a-vis the, uh, the promises of, of, of victory and success. Um, Suzanne is arguing that the U.S. came up well short of victory. Matt Kroenig is arguing that the U.S. came out on top in this war.
Um, Suzanne’s argument, uh, ce- centers on, uh, several points. I can’t get to all of them, but we’ll discuss them in the context, but I just wanna share. Uh, fundamentally the fact that the regime survived, that the facts of the re- regime’s survival, uh, en- entrenches them more securely in power than they were before, that there was enormous cost to, to the United States, uh, in terms of, um, impact on the economy, uh, the, uh, reputation of the United States around the world, um, and in terms of the depletion of military resources. Um, fundamentally, she says that trim- Trump was pinned down, uh, to a point where in the agreement that’s been, uh, discussed so far, the United States is making massive, massive concessions that it wouldn’t have had to otherwise. Um, all, all while acknowledging that, uh, the, uh, the, Iran was punished militarily in terms of the losses that it took.
Matt Kroenig is taking the other argument while, uh, conceding, uh, that in fact, the regime is still there, um, and, uh, that, uh, the, the, the, uh, uh, Iranian military was able to respond and cause harm, that fundamentally, uh, the nuclear program is in ruins. Its Navy is destroyed. Uh, the, uh, uh, Iran is fundamentally, he says, in a worse position, uh, than it was before, and that, um, the United States reputation was in fact enhanced, showing that it will step up to do the right thing. His argument also centers very much on the fact that Iran was a power beforehand that was able to cause enormous harm, uh, in many, many ways, both to its own people and to the region, and he says that that ability has been severely, severely compromised. And so in that sense, Iran comes out worse, uh, in, in the long run.
Suzanne, I wanna take to that, to you that point that, um, Matt’s making the case that Iran, uh, was capable of causing enormous harms to its opponents, which is a, a long list of, uh, of, uh, of parties, and that that a- ability has now been, been fundamentally, uh, fundamentally disrupted and diminished. What’s your response to that?
Suzanne Maloney:
I, really don’t see, uh, uh, how, uh, that case is made. Um, Iran’s threats to its neighbors and to its own people has rarely been carried out through its conventional military capabilities. It’s often been posed through its, uh, support for proxies around the region, its ability to stir and fund and, uh, promote terrorism against, uh, parties in the region and outside the region as well. And none of those capabilities have been diminished as a result of this war. That is not something that one needs an air force, um, which, uh, of which Iran had a fairly paltry, uh, force prior to the war, in order to conduct. And so I think that the, the metrics here are, are what the, the issue is.
Matthew Kroenig:
Yeah. Uh, you know, one, one thing I, this is not what, uh, Suzanne said, but one thing I hear is, uh, “W- well, Iran’s military clearly wasn’t, um, diminished because we see that it’s, uh, still attacking shipping with drones and, and missiles.” And, and I think two things are true at the same time. Uh, first, um, uh, it, its military was badly degraded. Again, uh, U.S. Central Command says that 90% of its defense industrial production was destroyed. Um, but, uh, yes, it still has remaining drones and, and missiles. A- and, you know, it’s essentially impossible to stop a country from producing a drone and threatening to fly it in, into a ship. And so that, uh, capability, uh, will, will continue to exist. Uh, but, uh, Iran is, um, much weaker.
A- and on the point, uh, that you, you started with that, uh, or the Iranian regime is, is in a stronger position, I think that’s a hard argument to make. The s- the Supreme Leader and much of the leadership is, uh, dead. I, I suspect if you asked him, “Is Iran in a stronger position?” uh, he, he wouldn’t, uh, agree with that. Uh, the new supreme leader, there’s really no sign of life, uh, of this person. They’re, uh, literally in hiding, uh, for their life. Uh, and th- this is still, uh, playing out. Their economy, uh, is suffering. The Iranian regime still could collapse in, in the coming weeks and months. And if that happens, I don’t think anybody would say, “Oh, we never saw this, um, coming.”
Suzanne Maloney:
Let me come back on that if you don’t mind. Um, I, I think we’ve just seen play out over the, the past week, uh, a massive set of funeral ceremonies for Ali Khamenei, the elderly supreme leader whose succession would have been, um, a, a crisis internally for the system had it not come at the hands of the U.S. and the Israeli military effort. In fact, um, the war actually solved what would’ve been a challenge within the system to try to elevate someone like Mojtaba Khamenei, a hard-line figure, the son of the, the, the slain supreme leader, because he didn’t have the clerical credentials or, or the support across the, the political system.
In fact, by creating this crisis, it, the, the United States and Israel really, um, handed Iran a win because they have been able to consolidate, uh, uh, leadership. They have a much more coherent and a well-aligned system that is now very much dominated by the hard-line military, the same military figures who are responsible for the horrific massacres against Iranian protestors back in January, and who orchestrated proxy wars across the region over the course of the past decades.
And so there’s really no evidence that there has been a diminution in the leadership. If anything, there has been a strengthening of Iran’s military and, um, a, a much harder line and more radical regime in place today in Tehran.
Matthew Kroenig:
You know, I started, uh, my, my career as a intelligence analyst working on, on Iran and, uh, intelligence analysts often look at threats by, uh, looking at capability and in- intent. Uh, and I think what Suzanne is, uh, saying, and I agree with her, is that the, uh, current leadership is, uh, just as hard-line, if not more hard-line, uh, than the previous leadership. So the intent to do harm to their own people, to the region, to the United States remains.
The, the question is, um, capability. Um, and, uh, again, the capability is, um, undoubtedly, uh, weakened. Uh, the, the military’s just not as strong as it was. And, and again, the, the nuclear program, uh, uh, a year ago, uh, Iran was very, uh, close and I was kind of depressed at the time thinking that we were just going to stand by and watch Iran build nuclear weapons. Uh, and, and now, uh, very hard to imagine Iran building nuclear weapons in, in the coming years, given the destruction to their, uh, facilities, uh, and their, their capability. They’ve retained the know-how, as Susan, uh, Suzanne points out. Uh, but, uh, I, I know how to do a lot of things, but doesn’t mean I’m going to do it with-
John Donvan:
So, let me jump in with this question. Um, since one of the stated goals by the United States and the Israelis was to f- you know, to f- deal a fatal blow to Iran’s nuclear program, as you were just saying, Suzanne, do, do you feel that the assessment could be made that that has been done or at, at a minimum that the war has shortened, uh, has lengthened the time to Iran, actually, being able to acquire a nuclear weapon? And if so, how does that figure into your, your calculus that Tehran won?
Suzanne Maloney:
Well, a war did lengthen the time that Iran would have, uh, i- required in order to produce a nuclear weapon, but that war was not the war that began on February 28th. It was the Twelve-Day War in June of 2025. That was the war that did the, delivered the most significant setbacks to Iran’s nuclear program in history. And frankly, had Matt come to argue that that war was a tremendous success, I would’ve agreed with him. I wouldn’t have been debating the opposing point.
I think the challenge here is that what we know of the war that began in February of this year is that the, the determination, as President Trump announced in his opening remarks, uh, uh, announcing Operation Epic Fury, was that it was a war intended at regime change. It was also a war that was very much driven by the growing threat of Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, which as Matt said, have only been reduced by approximately one-third. Yes, some of the production lines have been disrupted as a result of damage to civilian infrastructure, but Iran is still well-able to threaten all of its neighbors, both with ballistic missiles and with drones.
John Donvan:
So Matt, what I hear Suzanne saying is that the, the nuclear piece of this was already handled last year, not in this war, and that the stated goal of regime change has not be- which was a stated goal, has not been fulfilled and she’s arguing doesn’t appear to be close to be fulfilled. What’s your response to that?
Matthew Kroenig:
W- well, first on the regime-change piece, if you go back to President Trump’s speech on the, uh, first day of the war, uh, uh, what I heard him say is that, uh, to the Iranian people, “This is your, this is your best chance,” uh, not saying that the United States is, uh, that this is a goal for the United States, that we’re going to guarantee regime change, but that we are creating an opportunity. And I think the United States did take, create the opportunity. Uh, the Iranian people didn’t rise up and, and take it, I think understandably, given, uh, the, the massacres they suffered earlier this year. Uh, but I, I guess I never did, saw regime change as a central, uh, goal of the U.S. war. Uh, on, on the nuclear program-
John Donvan:
But it was, it was a stated goal. I mean, that, that can’t be-
Matthew Kroenig:
I, I don’t think so. If you go back and look at the, uh, exact text, President Trump doesn’t, didn’t say, “We’re going to achieve regime change in Iran.” Uh, he said, “We’re creating an opportunity. This is your best chance. Uh, ri- rise up and take the ... “ So it was advice to the Iranian people, not something that was ever in U.S. control. Um-
Suzanne Maloney:
Matt, on repeated occasions, President Trump said that this would be the end of the Islamic Republic, that the regime was over. This was something he’d not only stated as an aim, he stated it as an accomplishment of the war. And it’s quite clear that that wasn’t the case, and he’s actually acknowledged that himself in recent days, that this is no longer part of the U.S. policy.
The Iranian people were not in a position to take over, uh, uh, their s- their, their government at a time when they were being bombed and in the aftermath of horrific massacres. And even as the same regime was still very much in control, um, conducting executions, threatening those who might go to the streets, there was no opportunity that was given to the Iranian people as a result of this war. If that’s what President Trump had wanted to do, there were plenty of ways that the United States, working with allies and partners, could have opened an opportunity for change within the Iranian political system. Instead, the President opted for a war which has entrenched a very, very evil regime.
Matthew Kroenig:
I, think we, we’d have to just go back and look at the quotes. I, I’ve reread that, uh, President’s speech, uh, many times and I didn’t see him saying, “Regime change is a goal.” I saw him saying, “We’re creating an opportunity.” But, so we can ... Uh, maybe the researchers can find the, the quotes and we can discuss those.
But o- on the nuclear program and, uh, I gu- guess we discussed how do you define victory, I guess it depends also on how you define war. Uh, in, in a way, the United States and Iran have been in war for many years, and so I don’t see a sharp distinction between Midnight Hammer last year and, and the war in, uh, February. It’s a continuation.
A- and Marco Rubio, I think, uh, justified, uh, the war starting in February, uh, by, by pointing out that Iran was essentially trying to follow the North Korea model. And so one of the things North Korea’s done is built up such a large conventional deterrent that it would make it very hard for the United States or anyone else to try to strike, uh, North Korea’s nuclear program, uh, and stop it. Rubio said that Iran is trying to do something similar by building up such a massive drone and, and missile capability that it would be invulnerable, uh, to that. And so that getting rid of that, uh, capability was, was necessary to preventing Iran from rebuilding its, uh, nuclear program.
John Donvan:
Matt, um, Suzanne mentioned this and it’s, it’s largely out there in, in the conversation that this was the war where the Iranians discovered that they could, that they could use their power over th- or their re- relative position to the Strait of Hormuz to, uh, affect a very, very powerful asymmetric, uh, weapon against the United States or anybody who attacked them in the rest of the world. And, and you argue that’s not such a surprise. That’s not such a big deal. That’s not, not a new discovery. D- de- develop that though a little bit more, please.
Matthew Kroenig:
Yeah. So, well, I think some of the, uh, critics of the war have, uh, ar- argued two inconsistent points. They’ve said, one, uh, the United States should’ve seen Iran’s threat to the Strait of Hormuz. We’ve known this was a possibility in countless war games. Um, on, on the other hand, they argue that Iran is in a stronger position now because it demonstrates that it can threaten the Strait of Hormuz. Uh, I don’t think both of those things can be true.
And I, I think the true answer is we’ve always known, uh, that Iran can do this. Uh, this is something that, uh, I worried about when I worked on the Iran desk at, at the Pentagon. A- and so, yes, we can see Iran can, um, threaten the Strait of, of Hormuz. That was always a, a known, uh, risk of conflict with Iran.
John Donvan:
And, and also the point is that the United States was operationally unready for that to have happened. Do you agree with that thought?
Matthew Kroenig:
Well, well, I, you know, I wasn’t in p- uh, the internal deliberations. I suspect what happened is that, uh, the President and other leadership were briefed that this was a risk, uh, and they decided to go ahead, uh, anyway, uh, making the judgment that degrading Iran’s capability was, um, more important than, uh, threats to shipping in the Strait. And, and that’s an assessment I, I agree with even after the fact, uh, that, uh, uh, weakening Iran was, was worth the higher energy prices.
Suzanne Maloney:
Well, I think the, the proposition remains subject to some debate here, whether Iran has in fact been weakened. Some of its capabilities have been set back, but as Matt pointed out, the ballistic missile program was probably the most, uh, urgent precipitant of the decision to reengage in military conflict in February. And that does not appear to have been catastrophically set back. And so I think that w- I, I would question that proposition as well.
I also think it’s clear that the administration was not well-prepared for the full-scale closure of the Strait by Iran, even as it was able to continue shipping its own oil through the Strait, which is, which e- essentially precipitates the question of why it took several weeks for the administration to put in place the, the, um, uh, assets in order to impose a counter-blockade on Iran, which eventually led to, uh, some opportunity for diplomacy.
The Iranians appeared to have caught the United States off guard. The ability of the U.S. and the Israelis to hit specific targets within Iran is not, is uncontested. It was extraordinarily successful. But as s- uh, President Trump’s first Secretary of Defense General Mattis has pointed out, targeting is not strategy. And the strategy here ultimately left Iran with an upper hand, gave it the ability to threaten its neighbors and essentially constrict, uh, vital energy supplies to the international economy. And it eventually forced President Trump to agree to a set of terms that were initially proposed by Iran and, and a- a- accept it with almost, um, no real edits by (laughs) the United States. It’s extraordinary to see how much the United States gave away in the memorandum of understanding in s- in terms of front-loaded sanctions relief to the regime.
And the only thing that Iran committed to do in that memorandum of understanding was to reopen the Strait. Of course, their interpretation of reopening the Strait has been very different than what the United States might have anticipated. And so we’re continuing to see threats. We’re continuing to see challenges to resuming the full-fledged, uh, the, the, the, the larger, um, volumes of transit through the Gulf that had been the case for decades, uh, prior to this conflict.
John Donvan:
Yeah, Matt, I, I wanna discuss the memorandum of understanding because as Suzanne says, that’s another piece of evidence that’s brought by critics of the war, of, of the Trump administration’s war, uh, as evidence of, of, of failure in that it gives away so much, it appears to give away so much to Iran. Iran has to open the Strait, but they get sanctions relief almost immediately, down the road a $300 billion reconstruction fund curated by the United States fo- uh, uh, donors to be named, et cetera, and then someday a discussion about the long-range, uh, impact on Iran’s nuclear program.
Respond to that, that this piece of paper looks like, uh, uh, n- not of, a paper of, that a, a victor would be signing.
Matthew Kroenig:
Yes. Well, and, and let me start with a point of agreement if, if that’s allowed and, but it’ll, uh-
John Donvan:
Sure. (laughs) No, it’s allowed.
Matthew Kroenig:
... [inaudible ] another, uh, disagreement.
John Donvan:
Minimally allowed.
Matthew Kroenig:
(laughs) S- s- so, so I also agree that, uh, I don’t like the terms of this, uh, memorandum of understanding, and I do think the idea that we would have a $300 billion kinda Marshall Plan for a terrorist, uh, state is, uh, uh, uh, uh, a terrible idea.
Uh, I, get, I guess I kind of discount the MOU because I, I think it’s very unlikely that it holds and we’re seeing, uh, already with the exchange of fire, it’s, uh, not holding. Um, so I, so I tend to discount the terms of that. I don’t think either side really has an intention to, uh, abide by it.
Um, and then, uh, two, um, if you look at the MO-
John Donvan:
Wait, so you’re, you’re saying that your, your response to the MOU is it’s probably not worth the paper it’s written on-
Matthew Kroenig:
Exactly.
John Donvan:
... and therefore not concerning? Okay.
Matthew Kroenig:
A- a- another point I’d make is if you look at the MOU, there are, um, some things that take place or supposed to take place immediately, as you point out, and other things that are longer term. S- some of the immediate stuff, I, I could imagine coming to fruition. I, I could see both sides wanting to get the Strait reopened. Uh, but, but the worst, uh, terms of the deal, like the $300 billion reconstruction fund, those are things to be worked out, um, later. And so I, I think that’s, uh, very unlikely to, again, uh, come to fruition and not worth the paper it’s written on.
John Donvan:
Suzanne, let’s discuss a little bit of the, the, the, uh, global strategic impact on the unit- U.S. relations with both its rivals and with its allies. Matt made the point that, um, Russia and China were taught a lesson, that the United States is willing to project power still and use power, that the Chinese need to be aware of this, the Russians need to be aware of this, and in fact, they are.
So let’s talk about the re- impact on the rivals first of this war as, as it’s been carried out.
Suzanne Maloney:
Well, I, I take a fundamentally different view of how this conflict is being perceived in both Moscow and Beijing. I think that in both capitals, they’re delighted to see the United States once tied down again in a war of choice in the Middle East that is sapping its resources, that is dividing its partners and allies from, uh, their, their longtime support for Washington’s leadership in the world, and that has hurt the Western economy far more than it has hurt either the Russian or the Chinese economies.
And so I think that they see this, um, you know, really as an own goal for the United States. Yes, the U.S. has tremendous military capabilities, and as I said, the targeting is excellent. But our ability to operate strategically, to conserve our resources, to focus on the real strategic priorities that our country is facing, it hardly is demonstrated by this war.
Matthew Kroenig:
Yeah. So my response, uh, to that would be I, I think there was a perception and e- even a fear that I had that, uh, does the United States, uh, still even have the stomach for military conflict? And many examples over the, uh, recent years, uh, Obama setting a red line in Syria and not following through, uh, as Russia was mounting forces on the Ukrainian border, Biden being very clear that the United States would not get involved, um, militarily.
A- and so I do think that Putin and, and Xi thought, “Maybe there’s a chance that if we attack, uh, again, uh, NATO or, or Taiwan, that the United States would stay on the sidelines or, you know, do sanctions or provide military support, but not get involved, uh, directly.” Uh, and so I think b- by engaging in this large-scale use of military force ag- against Iran, uh, again, if I were Putin or Xi, I would have to, uh, r- rethink that and, um, and maybe the United States is, does still, uh, uh, willing to, uh, uh, u- use force in a large way.
Another thing I’d say, S- Suzanne pointed out, that munitions are being expended, they’re a cost to readiness. Um, I agree with that. Uh, uh, at the same time, uh, it is also an opportunity for practice. And, um, you know, many military analysts have pointed out that, uh, big questions about whether the Chinese, uh, PLA can operate or not, hasn’t fought a war in, in many years. Uh, this has been a months-long, uh, uh, training exercise for the U.S. military, and I have talked to U.S. military officers who see that as a benefit of the conflict, giving the United States the opportunity to try out new weapons, uh, and new, uh, tactics, uh, that could be helpful in a conflict with Russia or China.
Suzanne Maloney:
I guess I would just counter by suggesting that the President has demonstrated he is very well-prepared to undertake large military engagements, but only for a very short period of time. And I think that lesson is being taken and well-understood in both Beijing and Moscow, and of course, by all of our allies and partners as well, who, uh, for whom it’s e- extraordinarily clear that the President was reluctant to reengage with Iran, does not want to try to militarily reopen the Strait of Hormuz because of the time and the cost and the risk to human life that would be necessitated by that operation, and that he is essentially prepared to pay off a, a, a very unpalatable regime rather than to confront it militarily and secure an actual victory in this conflict.
John Donvan:
How do you feel, each of you, that the U.S. is set up, has set itself up for success in negotiations with Iran? Uh, again, those negotiations’ success would fundamentally, uh, focus around, uh, dis- in some sense, disarming, uh, Iran nu- in terms of nuclear ambitions, uh, and perhaps other ways. Would you go first with that, Matt?
Matthew Kroenig:
Uh, yeah. Yes. Well, I’ve always been somewhat of a skeptic of negotiations, uh, wi- with Iran. And, um, you know, President Trump ha- has said, um, that Iran has never won a war, never lost a negotiation. Uh, and I, I think we see their kind of slippery negotiation tactics playing out, uh, uh, in, in real time. So I’m, I’m very skeptical that we’re going to get some kind of deal with Iran that solves this. Uh, rather, my hope is that, uh, just the, the interest of both sides lead to, uh, uh, an end to the conflict, uh, a, a return of, uh, global energy flows. But I think some kind of grand bargain between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran is, is very unlikely.
Suzanne Maloney:
I’m similarly skeptical of any kind of grand bargain, so perhaps there’s another point of agreement there. But I would note that the vice president who is the lead U.S. negotiator in these talks with Iran does not appear to be so skeptical and, uh, maybe easily, um, uh, hoodwinked, um, in, uh, direct di- dialogue with the Iranians, as appears to have been the case with the, um, resolution of the memorandum of understanding. The Iranians got the far better of that deal. They have a f- a much more experienced negotiating team, uh, specifically around the nuclear issue than the United States does. And they’re going to bring all that expertise and, and, um, their, their skill at negotiating, um, to bear a- as these talks go on.
Q&A
John Donvan:
And now, we’re at the point where we like to bring in some other voices to ask questions of our debaters, people who know this topic well, who have been following the debate so far, and we’re asking them to join in with some, some good questions to our debaters that they can further debate over.
And first, I’d like to welcome Hussein Ibish. Hussein is a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, D.C. Hussein, welcome to the program. And, uh, what question do you have for our debaters today?
Hussein Ibish:
Hasn’t Trump maneuvered us in the United States into an impossible position, um, in the Gulf where we are trapped between two very unpalatable options? The first being embracing, embracing and pursuing an open-ended regime of aggressive containment against Iran that would require repeated future, uh, military actions, and this would be very dangerous. It’s a big commitment. I’m not sure that this administration or others, uh, want to pursue that.
But if not, then surely this is the beginning of the end of the American era in the, in the Middle East. It signals kind of an American pullback from the Gulf region, and I think that’s a proxy for the broader Middle East, which itself is a proxy for, if not Europe, then at least much of Asia and Africa, and it would signal a U.S. withdrawal from the Eastern Hemisphere in- into the Western Hemisphere.
If so, the word Hormuz will be remembered in the tones and with the connotations that the word Suez is in-- uh, was, at least in, in Britain and France in the ‘50s, ‘60s, and ‘70s, a synecdoche for the beginning of the end of a grand global, uh, but, uh, ultimately failing, um, political order and, uh, level of power.
So that’s really my question. Thank you very much indeed.
Matthew Kroenig:
Well, I think you laid out two possibilities. You know, one would be that the United States pivot away from, uh, the Middle East. And, and there have been many experts arguing that we should do that for some time, including some prominent officials in the Trump administration who say, “You know, we can’t do Europe or the Middle East anymore because we have to do the Indo-Pacific and China.” Uh, that, that’s not my view. I think U.S. grand strategy has had it right for the past 80 years that Europe, Middle East, and Indo-Pacific are all important and we need to maintain a presence in, in all of them.
Uh, and so the second possibility that you lay out that, uh, we, we will need to continue to contain the Islamic Republic, I, I think that’s true. I, I guess I would, um, uh, challenge the idea that this starts because of, of what happened in February. The United States has been trying to contain the Islamic Republic, uh, since 19- uh, ‘79. Uh, you know, we’ve seen it as our, our greatest, uh, threat in the region for, uh, many years. So yes, I think the United States is going to need to continue to contain Iran, but, uh, again, I think that’s been happening.
And, and I guess a final point, um, you know, th- and this is maybe a question back to you is, uh, uh, you know, what does this mean for U.S. relations in, in the region? Uh, and I, and I think, uh, it does show that the United States remains the, the major security provider, uh, for the region. And, uh, even though it’s not perfect, there’s really no other, um, alternative. And we did see, uh, U.S. missile defenses and other things, uh, protecting, uh, Gulf states. So m- my view is that the United States should continue to play a, an important security provider, uh, role in the region.
Suzanne Maloney:
I think it’s an excellent question. Um, the United States will be forced to retain some kind of significant military presence in the region, probably far larger than would’ve been the case had we simply, um, not gone forward with the, the, the most recent war with Iran. Iran had been put back on its heels by the Twelve-Day War in June 2025. Its nuclear program had been, uh, put into tatters and it was no longer enriching for the first time in nearly 20 years. And that was a huge accomplishment. The current war means that all of the, our, our friends and partners in the region are vulnerable to a drone through the window of a, of an expensive hotel, uh, or a disruption to their air travel or to the larger transformation of their economies away from petroleum and toward financial services, tourism, and technology.
So we will have to be there in a much more significant way, and it will leave us more vulnerable and will leave us more constricted in what we’re able to provide to allies and partners, and in terms of extending, um, American deterrence in the I- Indo-Pacific region. I, I think we have set ourselves back, uh, uh, uh, on a policy that, that frankly was a bipartisan approach of shifting toward Asia rather than shifting and investing more in the Middle East.
John Donvan:
Thank you very much, Hussein. Su- Hussein, I know what there was a question that was hanging out there put to you, but our, our rules are that only the debaters get to answer questions, so I, I appreciate your indulgence on that. And, uh, thank you very much for your question. So much.
And now I want to welcome Jonathan Schanzer. Jonathan is executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Jonathan, thank you for joining us and for listening into the program so far, and we’d love to know what your question is for our debaters.
Jonathan Schanzer:
I suppose may- maybe I’ll just start with, uh, a, a note to each of the debaters and then pose the question. I mean, I think to Suzanne, I would say that if this was an Iranian victory, which I doubt, it would’ve been won through war crimes against the Iranian people, uh, against Iran’s neighbors by launching projectiles at a, a large number of civilian targets. And then there’s the shutting down of an international waterway, a gross violation of international law. And it’s even harder then to talk about a victory, uh, in light of the evisceration of the Iran’s, uh, the Iranian regime’s economy, its military, its top political echelon, um, i- and in, and in general, its legitimacy. So I, I do think it’s hard to make the argument here that Iran won this.
Uh, but then to Matt, I would argue that the Trump administration seems to have lost its stomach for continuing the war, the significant reduction of American air defenses that we’ve been hearing about, the tapping of strategic oil reserves, and then the overall loss of leverage because of those Iranian war crimes that I mentioned. And it just seems to me that the Iranian blackmail of the world has left the U.S. without a clear response.
And so I suppose that in light of all of this, I would just say that I see an enormous amount of leverage right now being afforded to terror-sponsoring countries like Qatar and Pakistan who are now redrawing the map of the Middle East, two terrorist states now empowered to author a new Sykes-Picot Agreement or, or something. Not to mention Turkey, which appears to be the new regional power emerging. So have we ... c- can we actually speak about either one of these countries winning when they both appear apparently lost in some way while others fill the void?
John Donvan:
That’s an interesting question. Uh, and in the sense I was saying at the beginning, w- the question is, is there a decisive victory? How do we des- define decisive and how do we define victory? And you’re proposing that as both debaters are looking at the trade-offs of this war, you’re looking at the trade-offs and saying, “Nobody really won.” Um, and both debaters are saying, “Somebody won.” So I would like to take that question first to Matthew.
Matthew Kroenig:
Yeah. Well, thanks, um, uh, Jonathan and, and good point. And, and there have been, um, costs to both sides. I, I guess I would say I, I agree with all of your, uh, points on, on how Iran, uh, lost. So w- we’re in agreement there. O- on how the United States, um, uh, lost, it, it seems like a lot of your, uh, points were about what might happen in the future. Has the United States lost its stomach? Is it going to, uh, allow these terrorist states to, to rewrite the future of the region? Uh, and, and so I hope that, uh, doesn’t come to pass, but we’re, we’re trying to hit a little bit, bit of a moving target here. None of that stuff has come to pass, uh, so far. So I think up, up until this point, the United States, uh, has gotten the better of this and Iran has gotten the worst of it and, uh, hope that the United States doesn’t lose its, uh, stomach.
Suzanne Maloney:
Well, we were asked to speak to wi- one argument or the other in terms of our positions in this debate, but I wouldn’t disagree with your characterization of the Iranian victory. It’s an ugly victory. It’s an, uh, it’s a completely abhorrent victory for anyone who cares about the future of the region. But it is a tangible victory for a regime to have survived the, the, the worst that the United States and Israel could deploy. And not just survive, but actually mount a defense, while illegal and barbaric, was very effective in ensuring that they remained in power, that they, uh, were able to dictate terms to the w- the world’s superpower at the negotiating table.
And that also, to your point, the, the change in the region is working in Iran’s favor. Because what we’re finding, it’s not just you can disagree with whichever interlocutors you would like to disagree with in terms of their legitimacy and their, uh, authority, but fundamentally, the region as a whole, including some of our closest friends and allies, such as the Saudis and the Emiratis, have come to the conclusion that they cannot afford to live with a recalcitrant, impoverished Iran on their periphery, and they can’t afford to rely on the U.S. security umbrella to protect them from that. And they have to find ways to reintegrate Iran.
And so when we’ve talked about this $300 billion reconstruction fund that was referenced in the memorandum of understanding, it’s very clear that that would be coming from the Gulf states. It’s also very clear that they’re prepared to pay that price, even if some of their public statements suggest otherwise, because they no longer believe that the United States can protect them. And so whatever we maintain in the region, that will be with us for the foreseeable future.
John Donvan:
Matt, I’d like to see your, h- uh, k- your response to that quite definitive and strong statement of con- concluding where things stand now.
Matthew Kroenig:
Well, I’ll, I’ll just quote, uh, Anwar Gargash, who I think is one of the leading strategic thinkers, uh, in the region, uh, from the United Arab Emirates who, who said that, um, you know, he, uh, there has been some questioning abou- about the U.S. role, uh, but that, uh, it’s essentially still the only game in town and, and that their, the Gulf state’s best option is still to rely on the United States as a security provider. Europe’s not gonna do it. Uh, Russia’s helping Iran target, uh, them with intelligence and, and weapons. Uh, China’s barely, uh, present militarily in the region. So I think the U.S. security provider role will, will remain.
John Donvan:
All right, Jon, that was really provocative and helpful question. Got us to an interesting place. Thank you very much.
Um, I now wanna bring in, uh, our, our last, uh, extra voice, and that’s Sina Toossi. Sina is a senior non-resident fellow at the Center for International Policy. Uh, his work there focuses on U.S.-Iran relations and U.S. policy toward the Middle East in nuclear issues. So perfectly positioned to be part of this p- conversation.
Sina, please come in and join us with your question.
Sina Toossi:
Yes. Uh, thank you so much for having me. We see that the U.S. used the long-threatened military option on the table that U.S. presidents have threatened for decades against Iran. According to CET- CENTCOM, this was an unprecedented aerial campaign. Over 13,000 sorties were i- launched against Iran. Everything from, you know, uh, critical Iranian infrastructure was hit, schools were hit, universities were hit, steel factories were hit, bridges were hit, um, many Iranian, uh, military infrastructure was hit. A lot of that is as was discussed, but, you know, critically these underground missile bases that they built that have proven largely resilient and impervious to airstrikes were able to continue to launch ballistic missiles, drones, so we have the Strait of Hormuz closure.
So, Robert Kagan argued that, you know, this war was a checkmate for the U.S., that other countries will have to make arrangements with Iran over the Strait of Hormuz. We saw that, uh, Max Boot wrote an article citing the former commander of NATO saying what it would take to open Hormuz is something basically untenable, aircraft carriers, a dozen destroyer, tens of thousands of troops occupying parts of Iran. And now we’re seeing with this MOU that other countries seemingly are making arrangements with Iran. Japan, we had the other day that they were using the Iranian corridor.
So my question is, is what is viable for the U.S. going forward, having used this military card, having expended all of this effort and money and treasure and blood, and with the Strait of Hormuz closed, with this Iranian leverage, even if the MOU falls apart, which I agree is likely, Iran seems to just have much more leverage, so what is the U.S. able to do now after having engaged in this effort?
Matthew Kroenig:
Well, I think there were maybe two parts to the question. On, on the first part, uh, kind of a suggestion that U.S. military power has shown to be, um, uh, impotent. And I guess I’d, um, disagree with that. I think we’ve seen that, uh, the United States and Israel can remove the Iranian leadership, the Iranian nuclear program, and much of the Iranian’s, uh, defense industrial base anytime they choose to do so. Uh, so I think that’s something Iran’s leaders need to be aware of, uh, in the future.
O- on the Strait of Hormuz, that’s, uh, still being, uh, played out. It seems like the two sides have a different understanding here. Uh, the U.S. position is that Iran cannot be allowed to, uh, toll an international waterway and, and have that, uh, control. And, and I agree with that, uh, position. And so we’ll have to see how this, um, uh, plays out. But, um, I, I suspect-
John Donvan:
Are, are, are you, are you fundamentally conceding Sina’s point that it’s kind of a m- messed-up situation?
Matthew Kroenig:
Uh, yes. I, as I started in my opening statement, that is the, the biggest downside, uh, of the conflict, uh, Iran’s threats to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and, and that remains a problem to be resolved.
Suzanne Maloney:
Well, I think the Iranians will be able to monetize the Strait of Hormuz, at least in the short term, and they may do so in partnership with the Omanis or other parties within the region. President Trump has even suggested that he’d like to get in on the action. We also know, of course, over time, the economy will, will find other means of transportation. Um, the, the costs, if they are too high, will incentivize alternative routes. There are already investments in those by the Saudis, the Emiratis, and others. And so Iran’s leverage over the Strait of Hormuz is probably as high now as it will ever be, and it will continue to diminish over time as a result of its own actions.
Closing
John Donvan:
Okay. Thank you very much, S- Sina, for your question. And this is, uh, a wrap on this portion of the program because now we move into our closing statements to bring it all home.
Uh, Suzanne, you’re up first. You have two minutes, one last time to tell us why you believe that Tehran won the Iran war.
Suzanne Maloney:
Starting now?
John Donvan:
Starting now.
Suzanne Maloney:
Okay, great. For decades, uh, American po- political leaders have talked about, uh, the need for a new Middle East. They have dreamed ambitiously about a change in the region that would benefit all its people and bring peace and eliminate the need for the United States to be so heavily engaged in this region. President Trump, in fact, spoke to some of those many themes, uh, when, during his first run for the presidency in 2016. He talked about the e- enormous expense, uh, both financial and in terms of human lives, that was devoted to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and he promised that there would be no new forever wars. He seems to have forgotten that promise, unfortunately.
If we look at Iran on the eve of the U.S. military action in February of this year, it was a country under siege. It ha- its nuclear program had been demolished by U.S. and Israeli strikes in June of 2025. Its people had come to the streets to demand change. Its economy was in free fall. The United States was negotiating in a, and trying to achieve an even more comprehensive and punishing nuclear deal with Iran, and that might well have been achieved. Instead, the President chose to use military action. He did so without thinking through the potential implications and the risks that were at hand, and he has put the United States and the world in a far more negative position. He has enabled an evil regime to be entrenched in Iran and he has given it new financial and strategic power as a result of its control of the Strait of Hormuz.
This will be a defeat for the United States which carries significant and long-term consequences, not just for Iran and the Middle East, but for, uh, our friends and allies and partners as well as our adversaries around the world.
John Donvan:
Thank you very much, Suzanne. And Matthew, this means you get the last word in the program. Uh, you have two minutes to tell us again why you believe that Trump won this war.
Matthew Kroenig:
Well, well, I’ll just, um, finish with an, more of an autobiographical note. Uh, you know, my first job in, in government was 2004 working on the Iran desk and the intelligence community. Uh, I was back on the Ir- Iran desk at the Pentagon several years later. Uh, wrote a book on, on Iran in 2014. Uh, was on a congressional, uh, commission, uh, the Strategic Posture Commission, that, uh, uh, considered threats from Iran. Uh, so essentially I’ve been working on, uh, the threats posed by Iran, including the nuclear program for more than 20 years. Uh, and, and I’m just a microcosm of, of U.S. and, and allied efforts over, uh, m- more than two decades to address these threats posed by Iran.
A- and, and just, uh, uh, about a year ago, I was, I was pretty depressed, to be honest. I- Iran was on the verge of, uh, building, uh, uh, a nuclear weapon. Uh, and, um, I, I, I didn’t think the United States, uh, would take military action. I was afraid we were just going to watch, um, Iran, uh, build nuclear weapons and all of our efforts will have been, uh, for, for nothing and we have this nuclear armed terrorist state in the Middle East.
Now we’re in a very different place and I think Midnight Hammer last summer was one of the greatest U.S. foreign policy, uh, victories, uh, since the end of the Cold War, setting back Iran’s program. And I see this conflict not as, uh, uh, starting in February, not as something fundamentally different, but a continuation, uh, of that conflict.
Uh, and so there are, um, downsides as we’ve discussed, uh, and questions about the future of the Strait of Hormuz. Uh, but the, uh, Islamic Republic, uh, won’t have a, a nuclear weapon anytime soon. Its military and its leadership have been badly degraded and, um, that makes, uh, uh, I, I think that’s, uh, something that we should all be, uh, happy about, that we’re not going to have, uh, a terrorist state, uh, armed with nuclear weapons in the Middle East and that all of our efforts over the past 20 years, uh, have, uh, uh, uh, borne fruit. So, thank you.
John Donvan:
Th- thank you very, uh, much, Matt. And that is a wrap on the debate. And I, I wanna thank both of you, Suzanne and Matthew. Um, we so appreciate that you were willing to come and, and have an argument, but to do so in a civil and thoughtful way. I think, uh, all of our listeners learned something by listening to you. And even in the way that you did this, the fact that you were willing to concede points, rare thing nowadays, but, uh, didn’t mean that you were giving ground on your basic convictions about this argument. It shows it can be done. So thank you, as we say here, for being open to debate.
I’d also like to thank our fellow journalists and academics for bringing their expert questions to the table. So thank you, Hussein Ibish, Sina Toossi, and Jonathan Schanzer.
Uh, and finally, a big thank you to our audience for tuning into this episode of Open To Debate. As a nonprofit working to combat extreme polarization through civil debate, our work is made possible by listeners like you and by The Rosenkranz Foundation and by supporters of Open To Debate.
Robert Rosenkranz is our chairman. Our CEO is Lia Matthow. Andrew Lipson is head of Production. Michele Debreceni is head of Marketing. This episode was produced by Julia Sirkin. Alexis Pancrazi is our executive producer. The Open To Debate team also includes Catie Perry, Gabriella Mayer, Gabrielle Iannucelli, Linda Lee, and Scott Jacobi. Damon Whittemore makes this episode. Our theme music is by Alex Kliment.
I’m John Donvan. We will see you next time right here on Open To Debate.